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Political Philosophy and the Attraction of Realism 
 
©Paul Kelly 
 
London School of Economics 
 
In what follows, I want to examine the challenge of realism, but I want to 
do this by exploring the pathology of realism amongst political 
philosophers. In taking this line I am primarily interested in diagnosing the 
problem of realism rather than seeking to challenge, correct or cure it. 
Although I retain a constitutional sympathy for the activity that the realists 
reject, and puzzlement at the attractions of the realist’s position, my point in 
this paper is to try and set out what that challenge is. In effect I am 
concerned with laying out the structure of the realist position. This 
enterprise, I take to be a first step to an answer to the realist’s critical 
challenge. 
 
1. Political Philosophy and the Problem of Realism 
The charge that political philosophy is either insufficiently realistic and 
should be abandoned or else transformed, is an increasingly familiar one.1 
And as has been said, this call to realism is a difficult challenge to gainsay.2 
Who could possibly disagree with realism? Well of course, the right response 
is that it depends upon what the reference to realism involves. Is it a meta-
physical claim about the nature and ontology of values? Or is it a practical 
claim about the character and object of enquiry? What political theory does 
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not have, but which its sister sub-discipline of international relations does, is 
a clear target in the form of realism. Apart from its very early years, when 
international relations was more akin to what is now often practiced as 
Peace Studies, the subject has functioned with an idea of realism as its 
default position. The type of realism deployed in international relations has 
varied from classical to neo-realist positions and has drawn on classical 
political theories, such as those of Machiavelli or Hobbes, historical studies 
and more recently game theory and other formal models of political 
behaviour. Despite being the default position of international relations 
realism and realist accounts of world politics have by no means been 
accepted as true. Much international relations theory and all of what is now 
described at international political theory, has challenged the realist 
paradigm for explaining and justifying international action (see Brown 2002). 
But at least international relations has the advantage over political 
philosophy, in possessing some clear sense of what the virtues or problem 
of realism is. Political philosophers do not have a clear default position or 
common enemy when confronting the realist challenge. Political scientists 
might challenge political philosophy with being unrealistic or idealistic, but 
that is not really the point. Authors, who claim that political philosophy has 
some kind of realism deficit, are not arguing that it should be replaced by a 
more empirically rooted political science, or if that is the case, they tend to 
disguise the claim. For philosophers such as Geuss, it is pretty clear that 
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positive political science fares no better than the supposedly applied ethics 
approach of normative political philosophy. If John Rawls is the problem, 
then it is pretty clear that Norman Schofield, Ken Shepsle, Gary King or 
Adam Przeworski do not offer the solution.  
 
The perspective of international relations is different from that of political 
philosophy. In the former the nature and problem of realism is at the heart 
of the subject, whereas for political philosophy it is much less clear what the 
issue of realism is, and whether the many references to it actually have a 
common referent. A system of mutually antagonistic states with discrete 
interests competing for advantage over scarce resources explains why the 
realist’s default position in international relations is one of, pervasive 
conflict or the permanent threat of war.  It would be a considerable stretch 
of the imagination to claim that many serious political scientists claim that 
the background condition of politics is similarly one of persistent mortal 
conflict. Yet is this what is being claimed by political philosophers who have 
fallen under the spell of realism?  
 
One of the claims I want to make is that there is a surprising similarity 
between the claims of many classical realist positions in international 
relations and some of the claims of realists in political philosophy. The one 
obvious difference is the absence of a state system as the main object of 
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enquiry, but perhaps even that seemingly significant difference can be 
finessed. As we shall see the idea of ‘modus vivendi’ does extend a similar 
view of group conflict and hostility into the realm of political compromise 
and the justification of norms. I do not intend to claim that there is a causal 
connection between classical realist theories in international relations and 
the appeal to realism in political philosophy, although I suspect that such a 
case could indeed be made. An adequate history of British political thought 
in the twentieth century would explore the connections between a 
generation of philosophers such as Stuart Hampshire and Isaiah Berlin 
whose experience of the breakdown of appeasement in the interwar period 
parallels that of critics of the idealism of interwar international relations such 
as E.H Carr. The relations are complex and indirect but they nevertheless 
have a bearing on the culture of post-war moral and political philosophy and 
its self-understanding. What does seem to be the case is that the supposed 
attraction of realism in political philosophy is derivative of the attractions of 
realism in international relations at least in its British variant.  
 
International relations theory provides many parallels and insights in 
discussing the challenge of realism in political philosophy, and those who 
are suspicious of the challenge of realism can also learn much from the 
debates about realism amongst international relations and international 
political theorists.  One such simple lesson concerns how one characterises 
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the nature of realism. In his excellent book Ways of War and Peace, Michael 
Doyle (Doyle 1997) provides a characterisation of aspects of classical 
realism by reference to a number of great thinkers whose works are seen as 
archetypal statements of realism. Thus he distinguishes Complex or 
Thucydidean realism from Fundamentalist Machiavellian and Structuralist 
Hobbesian realism. He also develops a further category of Constitutional 
realism associated with Rousseau. The point is that each approach brings to 
the fore certain dimensions as central to explaining the realist perspective. 
Hobbesian realism for example emphasises the structural context of 
interaction, whereas Machiavellian realism focuses attention on the nature 
and motives of the agent. The complex vision of Thucydides on the other 
hand intricately connects agents and structures in contingent historical 
contexts such that one cannot simply emphasise the primacy of agency or 
subordinate agency to the structure of interaction. Although designed to 
illuminate the problem of realism in international relations and drawing on 
thinkers who have a very distinctive position in the subject of international 
political thought, this sort of approach can illuminate what is at stake in the 
case of realism in political philosophy as well. The relevant thinkers might 
differ between the two approaches, as there is no similar canonical status for 
these three thinkers in political philosophy because the cannon is much 
larger and the relevant representatives would vary depending on the 
conception of the fundamental problems of politics.  That said, there is 
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something to be said for a fundamentalist, a structuralist and a complex view 
as ways of characterising the problem of realism in political philosophy. 
Similarly, there is something to be said for Hobbes as the representative of 
the structuralist approach and Thucydides as the representative of a 
complex theory. The fundamentalist view is perhaps better represented for 
my purposes by a combination of Nietzsche and Lenin, although I will defer 
discussion of Lenin until the final section when Leninist fundamentalism is 
contrasted with Thucydidean complex realism.3 In what remains of the 
paper I will use these organising categories to explain and analyse what is 
claimed, by various advocates of a realist approach to political philosophy. 
The thinkers I want to explore under these headings are Raymond Geuss, 
John Gray and Bernard Williams, I will also include Isaiah Berlin (although I 
accept that he is a much more equivocal advocate of realism in political 
philosophy4), simply because he is such an influence on Williams and Gray. 
 
In most respects this essay is a response to Geuss – although the response 
only comes at the end. Secondly the two elements Neitzschean and 
Hobbesian lead to the third – in my case Thucydidean view as a critique of 
Geuss’s view, whereas in Doyle’s case the typology is purely explanatory. 
 
2. Fundamental Realism –Nietzsche (an assault on foundations). 
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There are two common features of the realist critique of political 
philosophy, the first is the claim that it is excessively moralistic and the 
second is the widely shared commitment to the truth of value pluralism. 
Geuss, Gray and Williams all share the view that modern political 
philosophy is excessively moralistic. Berlin is perhaps an exception but even 
he shares scepticism with the others, about political philosophy justifying a 
single unified moral vision and about the excessive defence and pursuit of 
ideals. Geuss is one of the more vocal critics of the narrowly ethical 
character of political philosophy accusing it of attempting to collapse the 
realm of politics into a version of applied ethical theory.  
 
‘Politics is applied ethics’ in the sense I find objectionable means that 
we start thinking about the human social world by trying to get what 
is sometimes called an ‘ideal theory’ of ethics. This approach assumes 
that there is, or could be, such as thing as a separate discipline called 
Ethics which has its own distinctive subject-matter and forms of 
argument, and which prescribes how humans should act toward one 
another. It further assumes that one can study this subject-matter 
without constantly locating it within the rest of human life…(Geuss 
2008, pp. 6-7). 
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It is clear that the targets of this criticism is philosophers such as Rawls who 
it is suggested, collapses the diversity of politics into the single ethical 
concern for social or distributive justice. John Gray makes a similar point 
but accuses modern liberal political philosophy of being in the thrall of 
legalism or the philosophy of law rather than of moralism as such. For Gray, 
philosophers such as Rawls and Ronald Dworkin see 
 
…political philosophy [as] a branch of the philosophy of law – the 
branch which concerns justice and fundamental rights. The goal of 
political philosophy is an ideal constitution, in principle universally 
applicable, which specified a fixed framework of basic liberties and 
human rights. This framework sets the terms – the only terms – on 
which different ways of life may coexist. (Gray 2000, p. 14) 
 
Williams, like Geuss, is also a critic of the ‘moralism’ of liberalism and sees 
this as one of the fundamental flaws of contemporary political theory. That 
said, Geuss and Williams’ emphasis on moralism should not be seen to 
contradict Gray’s critique of the legalism of Rawls and Dworkin. For the 
conception of moralism, or applied ethics as identified by Geuss and 
Williams is most closely associated with the legalist moral theory of Kant. 
Indeed it is primarily Kantian moralism that Geuss has in mind, and the 
same is true in the case of Williams.5 Gray’s charge of the excessive legalism 
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of liberal theory is also closely related to the overtly Kantian style of Rawls’ 
political philosophy.  
 
 
But a further and perhaps more important feature of the critique of 
moralism concerns the conception of moral practice that is involved. The 
common feature shared by Gray as well as Geuss and Williams is the 
legalistic character of morality. That conception of morality is shared by 
natural law theorists such as Locke and Pufendorf, as well as Kant and his 
modern followers, and it is to be contrasted with virtue ethics. For Williams, 
who is the most important critic of this conception of morality or what he 
calls the ‘peculiar institution’ echoing the American euphemism for slavery, 
morality is a distinctive historical practice that develops to replace the 
decline in an authentically religious conception of principles of social order. 
The core ideas of morality such as responsibility, duty and obligation are 
derived from an earlier Christian world-view, but are recast in a way that is 
supposed to save them from the collapse of the basic foundation of this 
world view (Williams, 1985).  The problem with this world-view is the 
absence of an authoritative law-giver. For Locke and Pufendorf the legalist 
conception of morality ultimately relies on the idea of an external law-giver, 
namely God. But the epistemology that is supposed to vindicate this 
conception of a divine law-giver actually undercuts it. Kant’s response is to 
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seek an alternative basis for this legalist conception of morality in the nature 
of practical reason. Even arch opponents of Kantianism such as utilitarians, 
according to Williams, still employ as similar conception of morality based 
on obligation. The fundamental difference is merely their alternative 
naturalistic source of authority. What remains similar in both cases is the 
legalist character of morality and the search for an authoritative source of 
obligation. Much contemporary moral philosophy (with the exception of a 
few sceptics such as Williams himself) consists of defending ever more 
sophisticated attempts to vindicate the legalist conception of morality in the 
face of the criticism of Kantian and utilitarian arguments. Much can be said 
for and against Williams’ particular arguments, but what is much more 
difficult to pick apart in the way much moral philosophy proceeds, is the 
underlying conception of the activity of morality itself. When the quest for 
an ultimate vindication is abandoned and replaced with an explanation of 
morality’s nature and source, we end up with a very different approach to 
the practice of ethical theory and a perspective from which the practice of 
moralism and ‘legislation for the world’ seems not only naïve but 
impossible. This explanatory account can be given in a variety of ways. In 
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Williams seems to acknowledge the 
power of Marxist explanations of the peculiar institution of morality as 
merely epiphenomenal. Critical theory, drawing on some version of 
dialectical materialism will therefore replace the moralistic practice of 
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legislating for the world. At best moral or ethical philosophers will be 
engaged in an analytical or diagnostic task very different from that 
advocated by most if not all applied ethics and in political philosophy. 
Geuss’s sympathy for the analytic and explanatory side of critical theory also 
explains his similar conception of morality as simply one historically 
contingent social form of activity.  
 
In William’s later works he appears to move towards a greater sympathy for 
a Nietzschean and genealogical account of the peculiar institution as an 
alternative explanation and interpretation of the origin and nature of 
morality (Williams 2002). Marxian materialist explanations of the practice of 
morality can have some value but they tend to over-determine the 
peculiarities of the institution that Williams wants to interpret and explain. 
The chief consequence of this more Nietzschean understanding is the 
emphasis on morality’s debt to Christianity, but with an acknowledgement 
of the ‘death of God’ and therefore an alternative interpretation of what that 
theological legacy is. In this way, William’s approach to ethics shares much 
with Elizabeth Anscombe, Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor as he 
acknowledges (at least in the case of MacIntyre and Taylor) in the essay 
‘Liberalism of Fear’ (Williams, 2006, p. 53). These Catholic thinkers all 
emphasise the need to respond to the Christian roots of morality albeit in 
different ways. As none of them share the Nietzschean view that ‘God is 
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dead’ the task of recovery, reform or moving forward in that tradition is an 
option that is not available to Williams and those who endorse the 
fundamental Nietzschean starting point. Yet as the choice to move back 
into or forward out of that world-view is ultimately not a philosophical 
matter, the ultimate vindication of the peculiar moral practice we confront is 
not going to be a philosophical question either. It is ultimately for this 
reason that the realist challenge is not a confutation of a particular 
philosophical problem or belief but a reorientation of the whole activity of 
thinking about politics, and one that reduces or even abandons the 
philosopher’s traditional platonic preoccupation with truth. There is no 
truth to be had, unless we adopt the perspective of Jerusalem over Athens. 
 
So far I have concentrated on the realists account of the nature of moral 
practices that underlie ‘political moralism’ or the attempt to reduce political 
philosophy to applied ethics. This account certainly resembles aspects of 
Nietzsche’s complex critique of morality, but it might also seem to fit less 
well with Doyle’s fundamentalist account of realism in international 
relations where the moral values and interests of individual agents is the 
source of international political conflict. However, if we turn to the second 
aspect of the critique of moralism the fundamentalist model appear to have 
a much closer fit to the realist’s account of politics and ethics.  
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One consequence of the Nietzschean or genealogical account of morality is 
that it decouples the practice from the source of moral authority at the same 
time as undercutting that account of authority. The consequence of this is 
not the collapse of morality in the face of scepticism, but rather the 
pluralisation of morality, exemplified most strikingly in the widespread thesis 
of value-pluralism. Amongst the realist critics discussed so far, both 
Williams and Gray are value-pluralists and both take their lead from Isaiah 
Berlin. Geuss’s position is more ambiguous and I will return to that later in 
the final section. 
 
As mentioned earlier, Berlin is not obviously a realist critic of political 
philosophy and this is underlined in his account of value pluralism. 
Although he speaks of the plurality of values in many places throughout his 
writings, and is clearly sceptical about monistic moral theories such as 
Kantianism or Utilitarianism, it is not clear is the status of his account of 
value pluralism (Berlin, 1998). One could interpret it as an account of the 
fact of the diversity of moral belief systems or one could interpret his theory 
as an account of the best account of the ‘good life’ being plural in character 
(see Raz, 1985) as well as a number of middle positions. Realists such as 
Gray and Williams appear to interpret Berlin’s theory as an account of the 
facts of moral experience, but they do not reduce this to the simple 
ethnographic claim that there is a variety of different moralities out there. 
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After all moral absolutists such as the Pope could accept that view, he would 
simply deny that the fact of diversity has any bearing on the true morality, 
unsurprisingly this is also the view of Alasdair MacIntyre. Instead Gray and 
Williams, suggest that the facts of the matter, and the genealogical account 
of those facts have transformed the nature of morality such that the thesis 
of value pluralism is the only credible account of moral practice. Given what 
we now know we just cannot pretend that there is a single authoritative 
account of morality. This view is captured in a passage from Berlin’s The 
Crooked Timber of Humanity, where he says: 
 
… we are doomed to choose, and every choice must entail an 
irreparable loss. Happy are those who live under a discipline which 
they accept without question, who freely obey the orders of leaders, 
spiritual or temporal, whose word is fully accepted as unbreakable 
law; or those who have, by their own methods, arrived at clear and 
unshakeable convictions about what to do and brook no possible 
doubt … those who rest on such comfortable beds of dogma are 
victims of self-induced myopia, blinkers that may make for 
contentment, but not for understanding of what it is to be 
human.(Berlin, 1990, pp. 13-4) 
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Although Berlin presents this conception of moral experience without much 
defence or justification, it is clear that it fits with the realist’s account of the 
problem of moralism and with the conception of the practice or morality 
that underlies it. Hence Berlin’s suggestion that non-pluralistic accounts of 
moral life and value might well be choices that people make: but it is just 
not the case that these can be seen to have an unchallengeable necessity in 
the modern world. One can close ones eyes to difference and diversity, but 
it is a relevant fact of moral experience that cannot be avoided, and in this 
the modern world differs from the apparently more integrated pre-modern 
moral world that we have lost. The Nietzschean genealogy that Williams, 
Gray and Geuss all broadly accept, provides the explanation for that fact. 
Berlin’s claim that this confrontation with radical choice is simply a fact of 
what it is to be human, also supports the realist analysis of the failings of 
political moralism as the variety of possible responses to conflict and 
diversity undermines the claims of the moralist to any kind of authority. 
Again the point is not merely to allude to the incompleteness of the quest 
for an authoritative account of morality. This incomplete quest model could 
indeed underlie a commitment to the primacy of philosophy over politics 
and experience. Indeed this is the model of political philosophy that Leo 
Strauss asserts in the face of the realist challenge, and which he associates 
with the character of Socrates. The quest for truth is the regulative idea of 
political philosophy and it is that which is denied by modernist and 
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postmodernist political theories. For the realist the question is not open but 
unresolved: the question is resolved, and the answer is that there cannot be a 
single authoritative decision about right or wrong in moral and political life.  
 
The fundamentalist account of realism sees the problem of political 
philosophy in terms of the irresolveable diversity of ethical and moral beliefs 
and the ineradicability of conflict between them. The flaw in the practice of 
political philosophy that the realist objects to is explainable in terms of the 
ineradicability of ethical conflict thus rendering moralism or the attempt to 
reduce political philosophy to applied ethics as groundless. Whereas political 
philosophers present their activity as part of a quest for the truth, the 
Nietzschean realist argues that it can only ever be a clash of will. This leaves 
a question about the character of the political philosopher – whether he is 
merely dull or dishonest?6 
 
3. Hobbesian or Structuralist Realism (the primacy of political 
experience). 
 
The second face of realism that I want to examine is the Hobbesian or 
structuralist. In international relations theory Hobbes’ is seen as an obvious 
foundational figure because of his account of the natural condition being 
one of a war of all against all. Scholars disagree over the extent to which he 
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had the condition of international politics in mind when he described the 
state of nature in Leviathan (Malcolm, 2002, pp. 432-56). Hobbes’s version 
of realism is also attractive to contemporary neo-realist international 
relations theories because his argument is easily rendered into game-
theoretic terms. This common view is also somewhat paradoxical in that 
Hobbes uses his account of conflict in the state of nature to explain the 
origin of the state. If the international realm is similar to the Hobbesian state 
of nature, then it might be asked why we don’t have an argument for a 
global state? That question need not however detain us. 
 
The figure of Hobbes is also important for political realists because he 
asserts the fundamental priority of politics over ethics (Geuss, 2008 pp. 21-
2, Williams,  2006 p. 2 and Gray, 2002 pp. 25-6). Hobbes saw the problem 
of politics in terms of conflict and the absence of order or stability. The task 
is to create stability and order as a precondition of any of the benefits of 
society. This involves explaining and justifying the origins of political 
sovereignty as the fundamental condition of order and using the sovereign’s 
will and judgement as the basis for an account of authoritative ethical or 
moral principles. From this Hobbesian view we can identify three positions 
that are shared by Geuss, Gray and Williams. 
1. The primacy of politics over ethics. 
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2. That terms of political agreement are primarily shaped by external 
conditions. 
3. All political agreements that are arrived at in this way are modus 
vivendi and require coercion. 
All endorse these three positions, but all reject or regard as irrelevant a 
Hobbesian state of nature theory as the explanation of the origins of the 
state. The problem all see as fundamental is the Hobbesian problem of 
order and legitimacy not the explanation of where the state came from. It is 
pretty clear that this was also Hobbes view, as the state of nature explains 
the emergence of legitimate political authority and not actual states as we 
can see from Hobbes’ account of sovereignty by acquisition in Leviathan, 
chapter xvii. Williams for example writes 
 
I identify the ‘first’ political question in Hobbesian terms as the 
securing of order, protection, safety, trust and the conditions of 
cooperation. It is ‘first’ because solving it is the condition of solving, 
indeed posing, any others. It is not (unhappily) first in the sense that 
once solved, it never has to be solved again. (Williams, 2006, p.3) 
 
Geuss also writes that 
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Modern political philosophy begins in Europe in the seventeenth 
century when Hobbes attempts to find a solution to the problem his 
contemporaries have in living together without assuming either a 
divinely ordained and enforced order, or a naturally implanted,  
invariable, and irresistibly powerful human impulse toward one 
particular form of cooperative action. (Geuss, 2008, p. 21) 
 
In both cases the account of the primacy of the political is connected with a 
rejection of contemporary political philosophy for its moralistic attempt to 
reduce politics to ethics. The account of the primacy of the political over the 
ethical draws in the accounts of the ethical discussed above. But the primacy 
could also be free-standing to the extent that any moralistic or ethical view 
of politics has to confront the problem of order and not merely 
disagreement. Without a response to the problem of order, the standard 
questions of justice, right and liberty could not even be asked. In other 
words they are all secondary values that depend upon the primacy of order 
and stability. It is not merely that we have to rely on political authority to 
originate and sanction artificial moral norms in the face of sceptical claims 
about the absence of natural law, rather the point is that these moral norms 
and beliefs will themselves apply to what Geuss describes as ‘contexts of 
action’. These contexts of action are the places where politics arises. 
Consequently the first question of political philosophy cannot be an ethical 
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question unless there just happens to be spontaneous political order and an 
uncontroversial source of political authority. Instead the first question of 
political philosophy must be about the conditions of political authority itself, 
and it is only then that we can then apply ethical criteria to it, if we think 
that is necessary. Geuss of course thinks that this is unnecessary as political 
authority has its own character and criteria of legitimacy. But even if one 
does not take that rigorous a view of the demands of a realist political 
theory, the key point remains that ethical criteria or moralistic approaches to 
politics are not just categorically distinct from political theories, they are also 
secondary. This forms the basis of the realist’s impatience with so much 
contemporary political philosophy that almost never addresses the 
conditions of political order, but instead assumes that the only relevant 
questions are how the benefits of social cooperation are divided up. This 
was also how Harold Lasswell famously defined the problem of political 
science - who gets what, where, when and how. Williams is one of the few 
philosophers to actually address this fundamental political question, as 
opposed to merely pointing out that others ignore it. 
 
The second feature of the realist position that is reflected in the Hobbesian 
approach concerns the emergence of the norms that regulate politics. For 
Hobbes the invention of politics is a response to the conditions of life in the 
state of nature. The conditions reflect individuals’ motives and interests but 
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also the external conditions of action. In effect Hobbes’ account of the state 
of nature is concerned with ‘actions and the context of actions’. It is the 
latter that is most important as this explains the problem of conflict and the 
need to settle terms of peace and stability. If individuals, despite their 
appetitive and glory-seeking natures found themselves in a world of material 
abundance and limitless space, then however partial they turned out to be, 
there would not necessarily be a condition of conflict. It is the 
circumstances within which persons and groups find themselves that 
confronts them with the ever-present threat of conflict and with war or the 
fear of war. This perspective also captures the fundamental political 
question as understood by realist political theorists like Gray, Geuss and 
Williams. 
 
For each of them the starting point is the circumstance of partiality and 
disagreement, all of which is explainable in terms of the fact of value-
pluralism. However, the further important condition is the unavoidability of 
conflict through shared contexts of action. Again if each group of people 
who shared an exclusive value system were able to isolate themselves from 
others in a sustainable way there would be no need for politics or the quest 
for common norms. That is not the experience of politics. Instead it is one 
where the possibility of separation is distinctly limited and where the options 
therefore are, fight or seek terms. For realists such as Gray, Geuss and even 
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Williams, the possibility of conflict is always a real option. That we choose 
not to fight is therefore not the result of some external pacific norm, but a 
political judgement about prospects of success and the actual conditions of 
conflict. But that judgement is always shaped by the historical contingency 
of our experience. Unlike the idealised individuals in Hobbes’ state of 
nature, who appear at least, to be creating a state, we are thrown into 
historically contingent political communities that we do not even as groups 
choose to make. The issue for us is always one of confronting and managing 
diversity within a specific historical context or managing the claims on one 
political community in the face of rival claims by other political 
communities. This is what Geuss means when he claims that ‘…politics is 
historically located: it has to do with humans interacting in institutional 
contexts that change overtime…’ (Geuss, 2008, p. 13) Institutional facts 
pre-date our thought about politics, so again, action is prior to belief and 
thought, consequently non-realist political philosophy gets the problem the 
wrong way around. This is most obviously the case in idealistic and utopian 
political theories which when confronted with the problems of the 
institutional constraints of politics and political thinking just change the 
subject. John Gray, following Berlin and Popper, is a particularly scathing 
critic of this aspect of what he claims is contemporary liberal political 
philosophy.7  
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Groups and collections of individuals confront one another in institutional 
contexts of action with different sets of beliefs interests and values. In the 
absence of a spontaneous and harmonious ordering of those beliefs, values 
and interests the problem and practice of either war or politics arises. If 
groups choose to fight then we have war, whereas if they choose to seek 
terms of agreement we have politics. For the realist there is no universally 
valid reason why they should seek peace over war unless they choose to 
value peace and security more highly than death and disorder. Of course, 
this is one point on which Hobbes’ actual theory was anything but realistic. 
Far from fear of violent death as a universal basic motive, lots of people 
throughout history have preferred death, even particularly unpleasant 
deaths, to dishonour or denial of basic beliefs. Williams, Geuss and Gray 
therefore, outdo Hobbes in their realism as none of them finds this choice 
of death over dishonour a particularly problematic or incomprehensible 
anthropological or historical fact. 
 
The basic political question is what are the terms of such an agreement or 
consensus that makes political society possible, and how do they arise. For 
Williams the answer to the first question is given in terms of the basic 
legitimation demand (Williams, 2006, pp. 4-7). However, his discussion 
shows that no simple substantive answer can be given to that question. 
Clearly, the basic legitimation demand rules out some forms of society as 
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legitimate political societies. Not everything counts as a legitimate political 
society, just because it can impose its will and demand obedience of those 
subject to its power. That said, Williams is keen to distinguish the basic 
legitimation demand from more substantive ethical principles such as those 
that make political legitimacy a consequence of justice. The basic 
legitimation demand is the terms that groups might accept and be prepared 
to accept as a condition of political society, and as a condition for any 
further ethical transformation of that society. At some level the basic 
legitimation demand will have an unavoidable ethical content and perhaps 
encourage critics to claim that Williams and the realists fail to provide a 
categorical distinction between the political and the ethical. But Williams’ 
response is that the point is not to establish a simple categorical distinction 
between political and ethics, but to establish the priority of politics over 
ethical perspectives in political philosophy, by showing that a more 
substantive ethical account of legitimacy is not necessary to satisfy the basic 
legitimation demand, whereas satisfying the basic legitimation demand is 
necessary before one can aspire to just terms of social interaction between 
people who disagree about ultimate ends. If the basic legitimation demand 
involves a moral commitment it cannot be one that is prior to politics. 
Political morality, if such a thing is possible, is political first and morality 
second. 
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Whatever the terms that are agreed between groups in establishing the basic 
condition of legitimacy will be a modus vivendi.  This is an agreement to 
coexist or to differ, between groups or individuals who disagree about 
values. Gray makes much of the idea of modus vivendi liberalism, whereby 
practices of liberal tolerance emerge as one contingent way of managing 
difference, rather than as a reciprocal duty of recognition. The point about 
modus vivendi is that they are both contingent on historical contexts of action, 
and that they are time-limited in that the parties have no special duty to 
maintain the agreement beyond their own interest. A minority might agree 
to tolerate a form of action it finds morally condemnable simply because it 
lacks the power and opportunity to impose its own will: if demography 
changes the minority into a majority than it would have no principled reason 
to continue with toleration of the condemnable acts. This was pretty much 
the view of the Vatican with respect to religious liberty until the mid 1960s 
(Courtney Murray, 1960). The modus vivendi approach also acknowledges the 
historical contingency of practices that liberal political philosophers wish to 
make universal, such as the ideal of toleration (Gray, 2000). This emphasis 
on historical contingency is a further feature that realists such as Williams, 
Geuss and Gray emphasize, for there are numerous possible ways in which 
the basic legitimation demand can be met in different sets of circumstances. 
Consequently, even if one does see the basic norms of cooperation as the 
result of an n-person iterated prisoner’s dilemma, this tells us nothing about 
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the substance of the norms actually chosen in that idealised situation. For 
that, we need an engagement with the historical specificities of political life. 
But what that n-person iterated prisoner’s dilemma and the specificity of the 
historical context both tell us is that the ultimate security of those norms of 
cooperation need to be enforced and sustained by coercion. In this way we 
return to the Hobbesian account of the norms of regulation as emerging 
from and being sanctioned by a sovereign power. The Hobbesian sovereign 
has the right to coerce, but it is also his ability to do so that makes him the 
response to the fundamental political problem. This is an ineradicable 
feature of any account of the basic legitimation demand and a further reason 
for maintaining the priority of the political over the ethical.8  
 
 
 
4. Thucydidean Complex Realism versus Leninist Fundamentalism – 
the lessons or moral of realism? 
 
The analysis using categories from Doyle’s account of realism in 
international relations, was been deployed to diagnose the peculiarities of 
the realist challenge to political philosophy and to link some otherwise 
diverse thinkers into a common position on the failings of political 
moralism or political philosophy as applied ethics. I have used two of his 
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categories to illuminate what is at stake. A still more nuanced analysis could 
have been deployed to provide a more detailed discussion of the realist 
position. I could also have ranged beyond the three main figures discussed 
as exemplars of realism. What I haven’t attempted to do is provide a more 
critical assessment of this realist position. Part of this self-denial comes from 
the need to provide an adequate diagnosis of a serious challenge to political 
philosophy and its current practice, without resorting to caricature and easy 
dismissal.  
 
By way of conclusion I want to turn to another of Doyle’s exemplars of 
realism, the perspective offered by Thucydides or complex realism and use 
this to examine the consequences of the realist challenge to political 
philosophy. I want to contrast the Thucydidean perspective with another 
modification of the fundamentalist perspective, in this case the Leninist 
version. This contrast is intended to illustrate differing perspectives about 
the consequences of the realist challenge, or how the residual activity that 
continues under the title of political philosophy should be conducted. 
 
Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War is the first attempt to 
describe, explain and theorise the realist perspective of war and the constant 
threat of conflict as the default position of international relations. For 
Doyle, the Thucydidean perspective explains the source of persistent fear 
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and the threat of conflict through the complex interconnection of individual 
beliefs, desires and interests and the contexts of interaction, where the 
balance of power is constantly changing through the quest for advantage. 
Thucydides’ approach is also historical, drawing on cultural and 
ethnographic descriptions and analyses, especially through the emphasis on 
the ‘national’ characters of the different participants. It is for this reason that 
Thucydides’ theory is considered a complex one. He does not rely solely on 
fundamental moral notions or merely on the structural constraints of action 
to explain international conflict. A further point to draw from Thucydides 
History’ is that it is in the end a history and not a normative theory. One of 
the reasons it remains such a fascinating work is its analytical power and its 
normative ambiguity. And it is precisely this point that I want draw out to 
complete my diagnosis of realism in political philosophy. The Thucydidean 
perspective can be contrasted with the Leninist view that is to be found in 
Geuss. In particular I have in mind Geuss defence of the principle of 
partisanship. He writes 
 
…[there] are incompatible global theories that constitute the 
respective correctly understood worldviews of the bourgeoisie and 
the proletariat, and they are irreconcilably at war with each other as 
are their respective hosts. Every theory to some extent takes a position 
in this war: every theory is ‘partisan’. Therefore, intellectual honesty 
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requires that one reflect on the contribution one’s theory 
makes…and acknowledge it openly. (Geuss, 2008, p. 29) 
 
Geuss’s point is not merely to identify one further fact about Lenin’s 
thought but to use this as an illustration of the condition of the political 
theorist. Given all we have seen about the contingency of political beliefs as 
a historical response to contexts of action we are faced with a choice 
between endorsing those beliefs and presumably the context of action or 
criticising and rejecting those beliefs and again possibly the whole context of 
action. The realist political theorist cannot avoid being engaged in and 
making partisan interventions in real politics. Political philosophy is 
ultimately a way of acting politically and we are encouraged to face up to 
that unavoidable fact. Perhaps John Gray’s persistent attempt to assert a 
liberal view of politics against the constraints of any particular theory falls 
into this analysis of the necessity of engagement. 
 
In contrast to this Leninist perspective one might see Williams’ view of the 
consequences of realism in a more Thucydidean light.9 Williams’ argument is 
much more nuanced in its consequences. He retains the features of the 
structural and foundational models as part of his explanation of the realist’s 
predicament. And this is developed within the context of the historical 
contingency of all human experience. So far his approach fits this loose 
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Thucydidean model. Yet where he is most like Thucydides and least like 
Lenin is his ambiguity about partisanship, as this too becomes a kind of 
political moralism. This is illustrated in his subtle discussion of Habermas’s  
approach to the connection between legitimacy, the rule of law and 
deliberative democracy and also the modification of his more strident 
rejections of Rawlsianism following the publication of Political Liberalism. 
Rawlsian Political Liberalism still retains too much of the Kantian aspiration 
to transcendence to qualify as an appropriately political theory, albeit that 
Rawls does seem to acknowledge the historical contingency of the 
conception of the political it embodies (Williams, 2006, p. 53). This 
acknowledgement of history does draw some of the sting of Williams’s 
earlier criticisms of Rawlsian political moralism, but Rawls still tries to rest 
too much on this undertheorised aspect of his argument. What seems more 
appropriate in the Habermasian position is an attempt to ground the 
conditions of legitimacy in an adequate account of modernity. This involves 
both the recognition of the contingency of politics, but it also connects the 
residual ethical dimension of politics with an appropriate sociology. This 
critical theory approach does not abandon the normative ideal of political 
philosophy for a positivist political science or history. But it does aim to 
limit the excessively idealistic consequences of an ethical conception of 
political philosophy. Williams seeks to rein in the excessive aspirations of 
political philosophy, and indeed acknowledges that Rawls does too, but he 
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avoids the more partisan approach advocated by Geuss which asks us to 
take sides in political debates. Indeed it seems that his realist approach does 
not rule out theorising justice, democracy and equality. It merely requires us 
to acknowledge the contingency of the questions and the contingency of the 
answers, and to be more modest in the claims we make about these 
questions. Indeed, a realist political theory will allow us to continue to do 
much of what is currently done by political philosophers, it will just present 
that activity in a different light. More needs to be said about this conclusion 
but perhaps apart from a necessary deflation of the grandiose claims made 
by political philosophers, more of the practice of political theorists may 
survive than is often claimed.  
 
                                                 
1
 As well as Geuss, we can identify Bernard Williams (Williams, 2005) John Gray (Gray, 2000), Glen 
Newey (Newey, 2001) and others as political philosophers with a realist orientation.  
 
2
 Few philosophers seem to reject wholly the aspiration to realism. A possible exception is the robust 
position that G.A. Cohen takes in the debate between ideal and non-ideal theory, where he argues for a 
fact independent account of fundamental moral principles and values (Cohen, 2008).  
 
3
 Antonio Gramsci might well have challenged the idea of Lenin as a new Machiavelli. That said, one 
can, perhaps overstate his departure from an orthodox Leninist perspective on politics (see Femia 
1981). Not much turns on this subtle interpretative issue. 
 
4
  Berlin uses what he takes to be historical realism (particularism) to act a corrective to grand historical 
meta-narratives Berlin 1996). However in ‘The pursuit of the ideal’ Berlin contradicts a basic premise 
of political realism by claiming that political philosophy is essential a branch of moral philosophy 
(Berlin 1998, p.1.)  
 
5
 Williams is also concerned about the legalist character of utilitarian moralism as well as the  Kantian. 
6
 The charge of dishonesty has indeed been made of Strauss’s Socratic conception of political 
philosophy (see Drury, 1998, and Burnyeat, 1985).   
 
7
 Interestingly, even liberals such as John Rawls are suspicious of utopianism on the grounds that it 
misses the point or changes the subject, hence his preference for what he calls realistic-utopianism 
(Rawls, 1999).   
 
8
 Perhaps surprisingly Kant also sees the right to coerce at the heart of political right and it is this fact 
that distinguishes his political theory from his moral philosophy. It is for this reason too, that some 
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Kant scholars are determined to distinguish his political philosophy from the ethical theory attributed to 
him in light of Rawls’ theory of justice (Flikschuh, 2000).  
 
9
 Geuss does of course draw a connection between Williams’ work and Thucydides in his essay 
‘Thucydides, Nietzsche and Williams’ (Geuss 2005: 219-33), yet in his efforts to contrast the Plato’s 
philosophy with Thucydides history he presents an interpretation of Thucydides which ignores much of 
his subtlety and ambiguity as Geuss’s primary concerns are actually with Nietzsche and not 
Thucydides. 
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